This paper investigates how leniency programs can induce collusive offenders to self report in a dynamic setting, where the risk of independent detection evolves stochastically over time. We show how this uncertainty about the future can push firms into preemptive application, and that these preemptive incentives may unravel to the point where firms apply long before the risk of independent detection is in any way imminent. The analysis sheds light on factors and policy instruments which favor such an unraveling effect. These include: little discontinuity in time and state, firms' patience, and a relatively harsh treatment of firms which fail to preempt others. In contrast, the described effects do not necessarily require a very high absolute level of leniency reduction, or even rewards.
Introduction
Firms which have committed a joint legal offense by colluding on prices face a risk: that the offense will be detected, and firms prosecuted and fined by authorities. Leniency programs are meant to mitigate the problem that such detection is typically imperfect and costly: By granting self-reporters a substantial fine reduction, they aim to entice firms to self-report, thereby reducing prosecution costs and raising the probability of prosecution, which in turn reduces also the temptation to commit the offense in the first place.
The functioning of these programs is obvious if the fine reduction is so large that paying the reduced fine is more attractive to each firm than continuing to face the risk of being found out. Intuitively though, leniency programs are thought to introduce also another risk: that one of my partners in crime reports and turns me in. By this feature, leniency programs may have a bite even in situations where the risk of independent discovery alone does not make it profitable for a firm to self report-but the risk of others reporting does.
Theory has had a hard time putting its finger on this preemptive aspect. Essentially, this is because in the standard static full information setting, the equilibrium concept itself precludes any such strategic uncertainty: In equilibrium, firms are assumed to perfectly predict each others' behavior, which means we typically obtain multiple equilibria, including one in which all firms self report, and one in which no firm does. Thus, not only does the model fail to depict a preemptive motive, but as a result, we also face the issue of multiple equilibria.
One idea to resolve this and identify preemptive motives more clearly is to introduce asymmetric information. This idea is pursued in a recent paper by Harrington (2013) , who argues that if firms obtain private but correlated signals on the chance of being caught, then the resulting uncertainty about others' signals (and consequent actions) introduces an additional 'push' for preemptive application. 1 This paper points out an alternative motive for preemption: symmetric uncertainty about the future in a dynamically evolving world. Our consideration of dynamics is easily motivated by the fact that if no firm reports today, and if the offense is not detected by authorities, then firms can always still report tomorrow. Moreover, fundamentals which affect this decision will likely change over time. In particular, firms' perceived likelihood of being caught will evolve as all sorts of relevant information comes in: as offices are raided, as a sector inquiry is launched, as customer complaints are filed, as authorities hire new specialists, as related cartels are prosecuted, etc.
This dynamic extension of the baseline setting can obviously lead to behavior which conditions on these fundamentals (and thereby on time), particularly that 1 INTRODUCTION 3 firms again apply only if the perceived risk of detection is high. Perhaps a bit less obviously, this in turn can spur preemptive incentives of the following nature: If I am worried about the fundamentals moving into a region where reporting is profitable irrespective of strategic considerations (i.e., I want to report even if the other doesn't), then I may actually want to report before we get into that region, in order to preempt others. Moreover, if the process by which the environment evolves shows some persistence, then this incentive to preempt can unravel and cause firms to self report long before the environment makes reporting dominant. This effect can render leniency programs enormously powerful.
We first illustrate this in a simple two-firm discrete-time framework, in which we let the likelihood of detection (the 'state') follow a trendless random walk. We highlight the aforedescribed preemptive incentive, and we derive sufficient conditions for this incentive to unravel to the point where immediate reporting is the only equilibrium. Crucial factors are firms' patience, and how harshly the leniency program treats firms who fail to be the very first to report (i.e., who report together with the other firm, or later).
Moreover, the discrete analysis suggests that the incentive to preempt is not least driven by how coarsely we choose the discrete grid for time and state. To follow up on this, we next consider the limit case of continuous time and state. This limit case vividly illustrates the potential power of leniency programs in a changing environment: For essentially any leniency award structure and any level of firms' patience, the mere possibility, however small, of reaching a state in which reporting is dominant is enough to make immediate reporting the only equilibrium.
In terms of policy conclusions and optimal leniency design, our model stresses the importance of being relatively harsh on latecomers, that this may in fact be more crucial than the absolute degree of amnesty given, and that leniency should still be available also for firms which are already under closer scrutiny by authorities. It also highlights the importance of creating an environment which comes as close as possible to a continuous setting-such as by clearly distinguishing firstcomers from latecomers even if the lag is very small.
Our primary aim is to better understand the strategic risks created by leniency programs, but a further motivation comes from an empirical observation by Gärt-ner and Zhou (2012) , which is that leniency applications tend to be made with significant delay, not only relative to the installation or revision of leniency programs, but also relative to the collapse of the relevant cartel (see Figure 1) . Generally, this hints at the importance of dynamic considerations, and that retaliation for deviations from collusive behavior may not be the only important trigger for leniency applications. More specifically, casual intuition suggests that the observed delays may be driven by exogenous shocks to the environment, which is precisely the setting we consider. Our results indicate that such an explanation will crucially rely on discreteness in time or state, which should therefore be carefully explained rather than assumed ad hoc. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3 lays out the basic static model of leniency application. Section 4 embeds this model into a dynamic setting, in which both time and the state evolve in discrete steps. We isolate the key preemptive motive and discuss sufficient conditions for this to completely unravel. Section 5 picks up on the insight that these sufficient conditions are not least driven by how finely the discrete grid is chosen, by considering the (hypothetical) limit case of continuous time and state. We show that for a wide class of models, including but not limited to Section 4's model, this limit entails immediate reporting. Section 6 discusses implications, limitations and extensions, and draws policy conclusions. Section 7 concludes.
Related Literature
This paper adds to a rapidly developing strand of literature which looks at the mechanics by which leniency programs affect incentives to collude and to self report (see Spagnolo, 2008 , for an excellent survey). 2 This strand has produced many interesting insights by considering various different facets, depending (among other things) on whether collusion is still ongoing at the time self reporting is considered (which can produce perverse effects in terms of stabilizing collusion), whether self-reporting is an on-or off-equilibrium phenomenon, whether the model includes investigations as a necessary precursor to prosecution, whether firms have (jointly) committed only one or numerous offenses, and, if offenses were commit-ted on multiple markets, whether leniency programs provide special treatment for multiple offenders (and multiple self-reporters).
We pick up a very basic strategic issue which, in different flavors, is found in virtually all of these models. As nicely described by Spagnolo (2004) , the basic idea behind leniency programs is to create a strategic situation which brings wrongdoers as close as possible to a Prisoners' Dilemma in terms of inducing them to self report. This idea faces a caveat, though: While it is usually clear that firms want to self-report if others do, the optimal action if others don't will depend on factors such as the level of fine reduction, the perceived risk of being caught independently, and other opportunity costs of reporting (if, for instance, reporting causes collusion to break down). Ultimately, this can lead to a multiplicity in equilibria which is difficult to interpret.
As pointed out by Harrington (2013) , the literature to date has largely sidestepped this issue by focussing on cases in which reporting is optimal also in the latter case-not least by proposing a policy which achieves precisely this effect through generous fine reductions or even rewards for firms that self report (cf. Spagnolo, 2004; Aubert et al., 2006) . In contrast, we know far less about situations in which fine reductions are not so high as to make self reporting a clear dominant choice. Technically, the resulting complementarities in best responses lead to multiple Nash-equilibrium predictions. Intuitively, these complementarities give rise to a situation of 'strategic risk' (Spagnolo, 2004) , in that firms' actions become driven by beliefs about how others behave. A better understanding of this strategic risk is desirable for two reasons: First, it is a key conceptual aspect which distinguishes the leniency-application problem from the traditional literature on public law enforcement with single offenders (see the seminal contribution by Becker, 1968 , and the more recent survey in Polinsky and Shavell, 2000) . Second, interesting recent experimental evidence by Bigoni et al. (2012) in fact suggests that strategic risk may be the main driver for leniency applications, i.e. that the fear of others reporting may weigh stronger than the fear of being caught by authorities. 3 Of the few papers that tackle this issue, Harrington (2013) develops a model in which firms hold private information on the chance of being caught. He shows that this private information-particularly, the uncertainty about other group members' information-can give firms an extra push to apply for leniency. Marshall et al. (2013) follow a similar approach in the context of multi-product collusion. Relatedly, Spagnolo (2004) previously used Selten and Harsanyi's (1988) concept of 'risk dominance' to select among multiple equilibria, which can be motivated by a similar story (see Carlsson and van Damme, 1993) . 4 This paper, in contrast, describes an extra push for application which is not driven by asymmetric information, but by (symmetric) uncertainty about the future: Firms worry about the chance that the environment moves into a state in which the other will report, which gives them a reason to preempt. This argument links aspects which have been touched upon elsewhere. Not least, though not stressed as a main result, Motta and Polo's (2003) seminal paper argues that leniency reductions need not always be so strong as to make reporting altogether dominant, but it can suffice for this to be the case only conditional on firms already being under investigation: In a setting in which the environment evolves in a Markovian fashion over three possible states (the initial state, investigation, and prosecution) and where prosecution must be preceded by a previous investigation, this can lead to a one-step preemption incentive in which firms report even before being investigated, because they fear that the other will report once they are under investigation. 5 This paper can be seen as embellishing on this theme by 'adding finer steps' to this argument, and by showing how the argument can iteratively unravel across steps.
This iterative unraveling argument itself is related to an effect pointed out by Motchenkova (2004) , who models collusion and leniency application as an optimal stopping problem in which firms weigh the continuation value of colluding against the risk of a fine which increases deterministically with the cartel's duration. There, the fact that firms know that the impending fine will eventually grow so large as to make reporting dominant can unravel so as to make firms report right at the outset, when the fine risked by collusion is still very small. Our analysis derives a related unraveling argument, but in an environment which is not deterministic, and in which there is no clear (upward) trend in the environment's evolution-reporting is not certain to become the dominant choice at any point in the future. 6 Our specific model setup is very similar to Harrington (2008) , who also considers a dynamic setting in which the probability of detection varies stochastically over time. The crucial difference is that the latter assumes this stochastic process to be without memory, i.e. detection probabilities are independent over time. Our results indicate that adding some persistence to the process can change predictions quite drastically. And indeed, as noted in Harrington (2008) , persistence seems natural when allowing for shorter periods, as we do.
approach to equilibrium selection. 5 This can happen in Motta and Polo's model when the chance of investigation is sufficiently high (see the first item in Proposition 1). 6 This also sets our analysis apart from the broad literature on preemption in technology adoption and market entry (Reinganum, 1981; Fudenberg and Tirole, 1985; Riordan, 1992) , where it is assumed that waiting reduces the cost innovation or entry. An analogous trend is also assumed in more recent extensions of these models to a stochastically evolving state (cf. Huisman and Kort, 1999; Hopenhayn and Squintani, 2011) .
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The flavor of the argument which this persistence allows us to develop in a dynamic setting, in turn, is very reminiscent of arguments in the global-games literature (Carlsson and van Damme, 1993; Morris and Shin, 1998) on static games of private information, where the mere possibility of an extreme signal which triggers a dominant action unravels to predict actions over the full spectrum of (more likely) signals. In both cases, the driving force for the unraveling is a complementarity in payoffs: The more prone the other firm is to report (the lower the critical signal or state), the more attractive it is for me to report (so I lower my critical level), and vice versa.
Finally, the general point that embedding a stage game with multiple equilibria into a stochastic dynamic setting can resolve multiplicity has previously been made by Frankel and Pauzner (2000) in the context of a labor-market model (see also Burdzy et al., 2001) , and by Mason and Weeds (2010) in the context of a realoptions investment game. Despite the very different contexts, their models share structural similarities with our continuous case. 7
The Static Leniency Application Game
We begin with a description of a static version of the basic leniency-application game, which we later extend into a dynamic version. It is identical to the baseline model in Harrington (2013) , but a similar structure is found in literally any (more elaborate) model of leniency programs.
The game is played between two firms. To focus ideas, we consider a situation in which these two firms have already committed an offense, but this offense has not yet been detected or brought to trial. If the offense is detected and firms are prosecuted, the (full) fine imposed on each firm is F > 0. Firms simultaneously choose to report the offense to authorities ('R') or remain silent (' R '). 8 If neither firm reports, firms are independently caught by authorities with probability ρ ∈ [0, 1], in which case each firm pays the full fine F. If only one firm reports, it pays a reduced fine αF, α < 1, whereas the other pays the full fine F. Finally, if both firms report, each pays a reduced fineαF,α ∈ (α, 1). 9 Normalizing the full fine to F = 1 (and assuming firms to be risk neutral), the symmetric normal-form game is that shown in Figure 2 . For ρ > α, R is strictly dominated, so the unique equilibrium has both firms report. For ρ α in turn, there are multiple equilibria: The two pure-strategy equilibria (R, R) and ( R, R), and a mixed-strategy equilibrium in which firms each report with probability
This simple model has various shortcomings. First, predictions are unique only for ρ > α. In this case, the model predicts reporting because the fine reduction is so high (relative to the chance of being caught) that reporting becomes optimal independently of what the other does. Thus, the prediction is unique only in cases where strategic considerations actually play no role. 10 Second, when strategic considerations do play a role (for ρ < α), predictions are rather weak, in that they include both the case of neither reporting and both reporting. 11 Finally, in the latter case, predictions heavily rely on the coordination of beliefs implicit in the concept of Nash equilibrium: Firms prefer to report if the other does, and prefer not to if the other doesn't. Owing to the nature of Nash equilibrium (specifically, its assumption that beliefs about the other's actions be correct), this complementarity in best responses translates into a multiplicity of equilibria, and which equilibrium obtains in turn is solely driven by beliefs-the formation of which is beyond the model. the 'first' is determined by the flip of a coin, so firms each receive full leniency or none at all with equal probability.
10 Formally, most leniency programs in fact award full leniency to solitary leniency applicants, implying ρ = 0, which would indeed make this the relevant case-and thereby predict the immediate dissolution of all cartels. Bear in mind, though, that blowing the whistle may entail various costs which are outside of the model, and which effectively increase αF: Legal costs, uncertainty about whether submitted evidence will suffice, and not least more implicit costs in terms of dimmer prospects for colluding in the future (due to stricter surveillance by authorities, or due to a loss of reputation as a reliable colluder).
11 See Spagnolo (2004) for a discussion on various possible refinements for equilibrium selection in this context, such as Pareto-or risk-dominance.
The last point in particular suggests that the model may miss out on an important intuitive aspect of leniency programs: That I become enticed to report because I am nervous about the other doing so. 12 The next section will show how such a story can be told in the context of a dynamically evolving environment.
Before we proceed to that extension, it is worth observing that the basic strategic issue captured by the above game extends to all sort of elaborations: more than two firms, that collusion is still ongoing at the time the decision is taken (in which case reporting entails the added opportunity cost of foregoing collusion in the future), that the industry is already under investigation (which will raise ρ), that firms collude in multiple markets, or that reporting entails a direct cost (of assembling documents and evidence) or a risk (that this evidence may not suffice).
Preemptive Unraveling in Discrete Time: A Random-Walk Example
This section extends Section 3's static baseline model by two aspects: (i) That, so long as no one blew the whistle previously, firms can always reconsider, and (ii) that parameters of the environment may change over time. For specificity, like Harrington (2008 Harrington ( , 2013 , we focus on the detection probability ρ as the relevant parameter. We first lay out a (discrete) model with these features, and then discuss how the interplay between the two can create incentives for preemptive reporting which are not present in the static model.
Model Setup
We let firms play the above game over discrete periods t = 0, 1, 2, . . ., where firms discount the future exponentially at rate δ ∈ (0, 1). In every period, firms simultaneously decide whether or not to report (we now refer to the latter as 'waiting,' at times). As soon as a firm reports, the game ends, with payoffs as above: A firm which didn't report pays F, a firm which did pays αF if it did so alone, andαF if reporting was joint. As long as no one reports, firms run the risk of independent detection by antitrust authorities, which entails a fine of F for both firms. We allow this risk to vary over time: In any period t, the probability of detection is ρ t ∈ [0, 1].
Figure 3: Random-Walk Evolution of ρ t over the Grid {ρ k } k∈Z .
In any period t, firms mutually know the current risk of detection ρ t (and ρ t 's past trajectory), but face symmetric uncertainty about its future evolution. 13 We let the stochastic evolution of ρ t be described by a transformation of a simple symmetric random walk: ρ t = f (X t ), where f : Z → [0, 1] is a nondecreasing function, and where X t denotes a simple symmetric random walk over the integers Z, which starts at zero, which can only increase or decrease by one from each period to the next, and does so with equal probability. The transformation by f ensures that
The stochastic evolution of ρ t can equivalently be understood as a simple (Markovian) random walk over an infinite countable grid P = {ρ k } k∈Z ⊂ [0, 1] with ρ k ρ k+1 for all k, and where
for any initial ρ 0 ∈ P (see the illustration in Figure 3 ). 14 As outlined above, such a random walk can be motivated by the idea that the end of each period brings news regarding the independent discovery rate ρ, where this news can be either good or bad (from firms' point of view). 15 We let firms play Markovian, possibly mixed, strategies. Firm i's strategy is thus represented by a mapping σ i : P → ∆{R, R}, which describes the probability that the firm reports given any current state ρ t ∈ P. The restriction to Markovian strategies involves no loss of generality given that the stochastic process for ρ t is Markovian, and given that there is no scope for conditioning current behavior on past actions: In any t, firms only face a choice of reporting or not for a unique history of previous actions, which is that both played R in all previous periods.
The Incentive to Preempt: A Lower Bound
This section's key argument for preemption evolves around the following question: Suppose we are currently in state ρ t = ρ k , and that I know that the other player is sure to report in the future as soon as the state hits the next notch ρ k+1 . What are my incentives then to preemptively report in the current state already?
To assess this, for any current period t and state ρ t = ρ k , we let
denote the probability that, starting from ρ t = ρ k in t, ρ t will have 'moved up to the next notch' τ periods from now (but not before). This probability is independent of t and k by ρ t 's Markov properties. Moreover, it simply corresponds to the probability that the underlying simple symmetric random walk X t , starting at zero in X 0 = 0, will first hit X t = 1 by any future period t. This can obviously only happen in odd periods, so γ(τ) = 0 for even τ. The process will be one notch up after one period with probability γ(1) = 1/2. The process will be one notch up after three periods with probability γ(3) = 1/8, as there is one path by which this can happen ('down, up, up'), out of 2 3 = 8 possible paths. Eventually, elementary combinatorics yields:
Lemma 4.1. The probabilities γ(τ), τ ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . .}, are given by
(1) Figure 4 's panel (a) illustrates these probabilities, and the rate at which they decline in (odd) τ. Building on this, we next let
compound the discounted probability that ρ t will (first) be up one notch any time in the future. This sum, which has no convenient algebraic form, is plotted in See the Appendix for a proof. The key rationale for this result lies in considering a hypothetical situation in which (i) we are in state ρ k−1 , (ii) both firms report only in state ρ k (symmetric 'cutoff-strategies,' essentially), and (iii) we ignore the fact that firms may be caught independently (i.e., no fine without a report). Firms' discounted expected payoff is then − ∑ ∞ τ=1 δ τ γ(τ)αF = −Γ(δ )αF, which represents the sole risk of running into state ρ k some time in the future, and then paying the fine −αF from joint reporting. This situation will be inferior to immediately reporting (alone) whenever −αF > −Γ(δ )αF, which is equivalent to the condition required in Proposition 4.2. The next step is to establish that this hypothetical situation in fact puts a lower bound on how attractive it is for firms to report at the outset. This is indeed the tedious part of the formal proof, but the intuition is as follows: Incorporating the probability of independent detection ρ t serves only to lower the expected payoff from waiting (i.e., from not reporting immediately). Likewise, raising firm j's propensity to report will only make it more attractive for firm i to report immediately. Finally, it is an immediate consequence of the game's structure that if it is not optimal for a firm to report in state ρ k−1 (and given that the other doesn't report in this or any lower state), then it is also not optimal in any of the states below.
Thus, Γ(δ ) > α/α is sufficient to ensure that reporting in any state ρ k will prompt preemptive reporting already in state ρ k−1 . This condition in turn is satisfied for δ high enough (recall that Γ(δ ) increases in δ from 0 to 1, whereas α/α ∈ (0, 1)), or α/α low enough-which (inversely) represents the relative benefits in fine reduction from reporting alone rather than together (or, more figuratively speaking, of being the first to knock at the enforcer's door). Both fuel incentives for preemption in an obvious way.
Preemption Unravels
The condition in Proposition 4.2 bounds preemptive incentives from below in a useful way: Because it ignores the risk of independent detection ρ t , it is altogether independent of the current state of the environment. As such, if the preemptive motive kicks in, it kicks in across all states. Straightforward iteration of Proposition 4.2 therefore yields: Corollary 4.3. If Γ(δ ) > α/α, then the only equilibrium in which some firm reports for sure in some state ρ k ∈ P is that in which both firms report for sure in all states. 16 That the required condition derives by ignoring the risk of independent detection also implies, though, that the argument thus far is completely detached from any real fundamentals: Instead of representing the probability of detection, the state may just as well represent a payoff-irrelevant correlating device such as outside temperature, or even calendar time-the implication being that if the unraveling condition is met, the equilibrium must satisfy Corollary 4.3. 17 All but one of these remaining equilibria disappear, however, if, as in our case, the state variable does have a real impact, and if it can reach a state in which reporting becomes a dominant strategy. Formally, letting v i (ρ |σ i , σ j ) denote player i's continuation payoff in any subgame beginning in state ρ ∈ P given (Markovian) strategies σ i , σ j , we say that reporting is a strictly dominant strategy in state ρ if
and all σ i with σ i (ρ) = R. Firms will then report for sure in such a state, which in turn triggers preemptive reporting in all states by simple iteration of Corollary 4.3:
16 Note that, allowing for mixed-strategy equilibria, Proposition 4.2 leaves not just equilibria in which both firms always or never report, but also equilibria in which they mix-but with a strictly positive probability of not reporting in all states.
17 Of course especially the latter does not follow a random walk. After appropriate recalculation of Γ(δ ), though, a very similar (and in fact stronger) unraveling argument applies.
Corollary 4.4. Suppose that Γ(δ ) > α/α, and that the grid P = {ρ k } k∈Z contains a ρ k for which reporting is a dominant strategy. Then the unique equilibrium has both firms report in all states.
We refrain from explicitly characterizing the level of ρ above which reporting becomes dominant. 18 Suffice to say that (i) the second requirement in Corollary 4.4 is clearly met if the grid P contains a ρ k > α, where reporting is obviously dominant, (ii) more generally, using the argument in the proof of Proposition 4.2, the set of states for which reporting is dominant can be identified as those in which a firm finds it optimal to report given that the other never does (in any state), and (iii) the resulting set is of an obvious cutoff type (containing only high enough states in P).
On a final more technical note, Corollary 4.4 can be strengthened in terms of equilibrium concept. For expositional reasons, we have focussed our discussion on Nash equilibria, but the proof of Proposition 4.2 actually establishes that, whenever firm k reports for sure in state ρ k , it is strictly dominant for firm j = i to report in state ρ k−1 . Thus, Corollary 4.4 can be strengthened in that, under the stated precondition, not only is 'always reporting' the only Nash equilibrium, but it is in fact the only strategy profile which survives the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies.
Discussion
A noteworthy feature about Corollary 4.4 is that the unraveling argument does not require a very immediate threat of being independently caught: The state in which reporting becomes dominant may be very distant (as represented by a situation in which the initial state is far lower)-the preemptive unraveling argument can nonetheless completely unfold from there into the present, potentially very 'safe' state. 19 This is reminiscent of arguments in the literature on global games, where the mere possibility (no matter how faint) of an extreme signal can trigger a similar cascade across the full range of possible signals (cf. Carlsson and van Damme, 1993; Morris and Shin, 1998) .
What matters instead is that Γ(δ ) > α/α-that firms view the threat of the state 'moving up a notch' as sufficiently immediate relative to the losses incurred from reporting together rather than alone. 18 An explicit characterization is cumbersome and uninstructive due to the fact that it involves expectations of a (transformed) random walk conditional on the path not having crossed a certain level yet. 19 The threat is anything but faint, though, in one respect: even if it may take very long, a random walk is sure to hit any level eventually. Discounting counters this feature to some extent. This issue can be further defused by introducing a (downward) drift, as we do in the continuous setting below. Figure 5 : Set of (δ , α) for which Γ(δ ) > α/α, given thatα = (1 + α)/2.
As in the static model (see Footnote 10), any leniency policy with α = 0 and α > 0 (full amnesty to solitary whistleblowers but incomplete amnesty to joint whistleblowers) will do the trick. If firms are sufficiently worried about the future, though, a less generous policy of incomplete amnesty may be just as effective. In this sense, and in contrast to much of the previous literature, the model at hand shifts the focus away from absolute levels of leniency reduction towards the importance of the relative benefit from reporting alone rather than together.
Note in this respect, though, that while the model may suggest settingα close to one (almost no leniency reduction whenever there is more than one applicant) and α just a bit belowαΓ(δ ), this may be problematic on legal grounds. Indeed, a common modeling approach (cf. Harrington, 2013) posits that simultaneous applicants face an equal chance of being considered first or second, and hencê α = (1 + α)/2. The set of (δ , α) which satisfy Γ(δ ) > α/α under this additional assumption are shown in Figure 5 . Since α/α still increases in α under this constraint (even if at a rate lower than one), stronger leniency (lower α) will still decrease the critical δ above which unraveling takes place. As leniency becomes full (α → 0), the critical δ again approaches zero. 20 Finally, whether unraveling takes place or not will crucially depend on how finely we choose the grid of the discrete model, in the following sense: Suppose we reduce the length of periods, raise δ accordingly, and similarly make the grid for ρ t finer (so as to make sure that the stochastic process retains a similar variability over time). If we proceed to make the grid sufficiently fine in this manner, then the condition for unraveling will eventually hold. This is troublesome for two interrelated reasons: First, there is no clear natural rationale for how small intervals in time and state should be, and this may even reflect policy choices (such as if authorities actually consider applications which drop in within x days of each other 'simultaneous'). Second, we would not want predictions to depend crucially on an arbitrary choice of grid.
The next section picks up on this point by considering the case of continuous time and state. Not only does this represent the natural limit case of the above argument of 'making the grid finer'-the continuous-time setting is also much more amenable to more general processes for ρ t . In particular, it allows us to conveniently consider processes which, unlike the random walk considered above, are less than certain to eventually hit a region in which reporting is dominant.
Before proceeding to the continuous case, let us still put into perspective two issues in the discrete case. First, what if the condition Γ(δ ) > α/α is violated? In this case, the described effect can still lower the threshold ρ above which firms necessarily report well below the level above which it is statically dominant, but the argument need not unravel all the way to the lowest possible ρ on the grid (in which case, for low ρ, we are back to an issue of multiple equilibria). Second, what about other processes for ρ t ? For instance, we might want to consider processes by which ρ t can jump more than a notch (or stay constant) from one period to the next, or in which there is a downward drift in that ρ t is more likely to fall than to rise? Formally, this will result in different (and less conveniently derivable) probabilities γ(τ) and Γ(δ ), but leave the remaining argument and results unchanged. However, we can no longer be sure that lim δ →1 Γ(δ ) = 1, and, consequently, that there exists a α/α > 0 such that complete unraveling takes place. Again, this motivates the following continuous analysis, where such generalizations are easier to handle.
Continuous Time and State: A Limit Result
We assume in this section that the game described above is played in continuous time t ∈ [0, ∞), where both firms discount the future exponentially at rate r > 0. At any t, the risk of independent detection by antitrust authorities is now captured by an instantaneous hazard rate ρ t ∈ [0, ∞), so that the probability of having been independently detected by any t (the 'failure probability') is 1 − exp(− t 0 ρ τ dτ). We let ρ t be governed by a transformed random walk ρ t = f (X t ), where X t is Brownian motion, and f is a smooth and strictly increasing mapping from R into [0, ∞). This is a natural continuous-limit extension of the discrete-time process considered in the previous section (and, by the functional central limit theorem, of a much wider class of discrete processes). In contrast to Section 4, we now allow for drift in X t , so so X t = W t + µt, where W t is a standard Wiener process. Figure 6 illustrates this class of processes by plotting sample realizations for processes with and without drift (all somewhat arbitrarily originating at ρ 0 = 0.2).
To avoid cumbersome technicalities, we follow Harrington (2013) in restricting firms to pure (and stationary) strategies of a cut-off type: Each firm i is assumed to report if and only if the state ρ t exceeds a certain thresholdρ i . Clearly, equilibria cannot be asymmetric: Sinceα < 1, given that one firm reports in a certain state, it can never be optimal for the other firm not to report in that same state. All remaining non-degenerate cutoff equilibria, in turn, can be ruled out by a preemption argument similar to that in the discrete case, which yields:
Proposition 5.1. The only (cutoff-) equilibria are those in which both firms always or never report (i.e., in all states or in no states).
See the Appendix for a proof. Importantly, in contrast to the discrete-time analogue in Proposition 4.2, this result holds for any α/α < 1, and for any discount rate r > 0.
The intuition for Proposition 5.1 lies in a key property of Brownian motion: That, albeit on a small scale, such a process is sufficiently 'nervous' even over very short time intervals. Specifically, a process starting at zero is certain to take on strictly positive values within any (arbitrarily small) [0,t] . Therefore, for any symmetric candidate cutoff-equilibrium with thresholdρ, there exists a state ρ <ρ (sufficiently close) such that the probability of jointly reporting in the very near future is arbitrarily close to one. For ρ close enough to the thresholdρ, firms therefore have an incentive to preempt which parallels that in the discrete caseonly that it is now altogether independent of firms' patience and the magnitude of α/α.
Again as above, the mere possibility of reaching a state ρ in which reporting is dominant is enough to eliminate the 'never report'-equilibrium:
Corollary 5.2. If f (R) contains an interval of ρ over which reporting is dominant, then the only equilibrium has firms report in all states.
This result illustrates the high potential of leniency programs in a dynamic environment: For any α/α < 1 and any level of firms' patience, the mere possibility of reaching a state in which reporting is dominant is enough to make immediate reporting the only equilibrium. 21 Interpreting the continuous case as a limit case of Section 4's discrete model, the message of Corollary 5.2 is that discreteness, particularly the size thereof, matters a lot, in that the same holds for a sufficiently fine grid.
Moreover, the result in Corollary 5.2 is more general because it represents a continuous-time limit to a larger class of discrete models than just the example of Section 4, not least by allowing for (downward) drift in the process. And it is easy to see that the result in fact extends to an even broader class of processes than transformed Brownian motion with drift: The key rationale is a local one which, roughly speaking, requires that the probability of ρ t increasing by ρ + ε within the next instant τ comes close to one for small τ, ε. As such, the argument extends to a broad class of processes which retain this random-walk property in a local sense, such as: (i) the introduction of some kind of mean reversion, or (ii) the addition of random occasional discrete jumps (see also Frankel and Pauzner, 2000 , for a discussion of extensions along these lines).
Relative to Section 4's analysis, some technical caveats apply. First, the derivation of Corollary 5.2 focussed on stationary, pure strategies of a cutoff type. While stationarity and the cutoff-property are easily seen to be nonessential using the same arguments as in Section 4, an explicit treatment of mixed strategies would be technically cumbersome. 22 Because our discrete analysis did allow for mixed strategies, we can be sure though that mixed strategies might in the worst case 21 Again, this result is reminiscent of results in the global-games literature, where the uniqueness argument is typically shown to hold when firms' individual signals of the common parameter are perturbed by an arbitrarily small amount. 22 We would need two functions to describe generic mixed strategies: A cumulative distribution function which describes the probability that the player has moved by a given time t, and an intensity function which measures the intensity of atoms in the interval [t,t + dt] , where the latter replicates discrete-time results which are lost in passing to the continuous-time limit (see Fudenberg and Tirole, 1985) . weaken our prediction in, but not around the limit (i.e., for a discrete, but sufficiently fine grid). Second, in contrast to Corollary 4.4, the unique Nash prediction obtained in Corollary 5.2 cannot be strengthened using iterated dominance arguments. This is because there generally exists no best response to the other reporting above a certain levelρ j : Given almost sure continuity of Brownian motion, a firm would optimally want to choose its cutoff level below, but arbitrarily close. 23 Again, this is a mere technical issue, though, if we view the continuous case as a hypothetical limit case which approximates an arbitrarily fine grid. 24
Discussion and Policy Implications
The analyses of the discrete and the continuous case offer complementary insights on preemptive leniency application in an evolving environment: The former illustrates key drivers for preemption when discreteness matters, whereas the latter provides a telling illustration of the effect's potential when this discreteness becomes sufficiently immaterial. This section first discusses crucial limitations and extensions to the two models, and the discusses insights and implied policy recommendations.
Limitations and Extensions
Particularly the continuous analysis above should certainly be taken with a grain of salt. Not only does it predict immediate dissolution of all cartels, but continuity also takes some assumptions to the extreme-such as that preempting the rival by a literal split second leads to drastically different payoffs than being a split second late. Moreover, by letting the state follow Brownian motion, the continuous case relies on a strong 'nervousness' in the state: The probability that no news comes in the next instant is zero. This feature becomes more crucial for preemption and unraveling the more strongly firms discount and the stronger the downward drift. These caveats in mind, the continuous case might indeed best be interpreted as a hypothetical but instructive limit case which takes precisely these features to an extreme.
A methodological caveat which concerns both the discrete and the continuous analysis is that the unraveling argument in both cases relies heavily on backward induction arguments. Indeed, the game shares structural similarities with Rosenthal's (1981) centipede game, which raises the question: If players deviate by not reporting at the outset, is it reasonable to assume that they return to equilibrium play in the ensuing subgame? While this is a valid worry, there is no obvious candidate for an alternative equilibrium concept. 25 Moreover, similarly strong assumptions underlie also the iterated dominance arguments in global games.
A further limitation lies in the fact that, while we assumed firms to be uncertain about the future, we assumed their assessment thereof to be completely symmetric. And indeed, it is easy to imagine situations where firms' assessment of the future (and present) is asymmetrically tainted by private bits of information (or, relatedly, by different judgement of public facts). How this would alter our results is not clear. On the one hand, we know from Harrington (2013) that, by purely static considerations, private information creates an additional push for preemption because firms worry about the other having received a higher signal. On the other hand, private information might well soften the dynamic unraveling effect pointed out above, as firms become uncertain about how close the opponent is to his reporting threshold. How these two effects combine is not clear and should be an interesting question for further research. 26 Finally, our analysis has focussed on one particular source of an uncertain future, namely firms' perceived chance of being caught independently. The key argument easily extends to many other dimensions of the environment, provided that this dimension has the potential to make reporting dominant. For instance, reporting might reduce a firm's prospect of future collusion (because of higher distrust from fellow competitors or due to a more alert antitrust authority), which creates an opportunity cost of reporting. By this channel, anything that affects the future value of collusion (GDP, industry profitability, the interest rate, the number of firms, etc.) can trigger the same kind of preemption. 27 Moreover, such factors might reasonably evolve in a quite continuous fashion-arguably even more so than firms' perceived chance of being caught.
Implications for Policy and Modeling
The above caveats notwithstanding, the analysis produces useful policy insights. First, the discrete model shows that α/α, the ratio of fines granted to a solitary firstcomer and joint whistleblowers, respectively, plays a key role for whether leniency programs can spark the preemptive 'panic' described by the unraveling argument. Generally, this suggests being harsh on firms that fail to preempt fellow colluders. In particular, using a slightly broader interpretation of the model, it proposes a harsh treatment of firms whose leniency application postdates the first application. This illustrates an aspect by which leniency programs which essentially preclude fine reductions for latecomers (such as in the US, Israel, and Brazil) may be more effective than programs in which awarding latecomers is not only permitted (such as in the EU), but where this option is frequently exercised. 28, 29 In contrast to both to the literature on single offenders (the literature following Becker, 1968) and much of the literature on leniency programs (cf. Spagnolo, 2004; Aubert et al., 2006) , the model also illustrates that being relatively lenient on solitary firstcomers (α/α in our model) may be more important than the absolute level of leniency α. In particular, our models show that it is possible to bust cartels at much lower cost than by setting α < ρ (the static requirement): At the continuous-time limit, settingα close to one and α just an epsilon below will do the trick.
A bit less obviously, the model's key mechanism relies on firms still being eligible for leniency at higher levels of ρ: Reporting being dominant when firms are more likely to get caught is a necessary starting point for the preemption argument to unravel also into calmer states. This resonates with policy recommendations in Motta and Polo (2003) and Chen and Rey (2012) , who suggest that leniency should be accessible also to firms that are already under investigation by authorities (corresponding to a higher ρ in our model). Moreover, it might be seen as operationalizing current US guidelines by which, to qualify for leniency, "The Division, at the time the corporation comes in, does not yet have evidence against the company that is likely to result in a sustainable conviction." 30, 31 Further insights for policy come from the result that the discreteness of the 28 Needless to say, there are aspects which are outside of the current model which may reinvoke a rationale for awarding late leniency applicants, such as if the latter delivers additional information which significantly reduces the costs of prosecution.
29 See the recent OECD's (2012) roundtable on 'leniency for subsequent applicants' for an interesting practical discussion and an overview of how different countries' leniency programs treat latecomers.
30 See the US DOJ's guidelines at www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0091.pdf. 31 On a related note, to the extent that our literal model considers the problem of self reporting a completed rather than an ongoing crime, policy should impose a time limit neither on firms' liability nor on their access to leniency, as this may similarly jeopardize the (possibly quite distant) anchor for the unraveling argument.
grid is a decisive driver, as illustrated by the continuous limit case. In broad terms, this suggests that policy should do whatever it can to remove obstacles to continuity. As far as discreteness in time is concerned, this adds another angle to the above theme of discriminating harshly between first-and latecomers, in terms of differentiating not just with regard to fine levels, but also with regard to time: An effective policy should award firms for being even just a bit early, and be harsh on those who are even just a bit late. 32 As far as discreteness in the state is concerned, the model somewhat more vaguely suggests that policy should do whatever it can to let firms' perceived assessment of the environment evolve in many small as opposed to few big stepsfirms should essentially expect an update 'any minute.' More specifically, insofar as information dispersed by authorities themselves will influences firms' assessed risk of being caught, this suggests that authorities might want to be rather communicative in terms of spreading any new information in small pieces rather than in accumulated chunks. 33 Finally, besides policy advice, the analysis also conveys useful modeling advice regarding models of leniency programs in a discrete stochastic environment (and discrete preemption games, more generally). It shows that how finely the discrete grid is chosen can be anything but irrelevant. Arguments which may go through in a two-state model (such as: firms only report in the high state, which might explain the type of delays found in Gärtner and Zhou, 2012) may well collapse as soon as we introduce an intermediate third state. A meaningful analysis should thus carefully choose and explain these discontinuities rather than assume them ad hoc, as the results may well be driven by precisely these discontinuities. 34 In conclusion, perhaps the following thought experiment nicely brings out our analysis' basic punchline: Suppose that antitrust authorities had the means to convict any offenders if they only put sufficient (possibly very high, but finite) cost and effort into it (by collecting all sorts of data and evidence, forming large ex-pert teams, etc.). 35 Then an effective (and arbitrarily cheap) leniency policy could proceed as follows: For any industry, construct a public indicator which follows a random walk. As soon as this indicator hits a certain predefined level, investigate the industry with all possible rigor (so that, if there was an offense it is found with probability one). By the above analysis, the trigger levels for the indicators could be chosen arbitrarily high, meaning a rigorous investigation is very unlikely to ever occur-but the unraveling effect would kick in. Thus, with very low discounted and expected costs of investigation (coming from the arbitrarily unlikely event of an investigation), authorities could achieve an extreme effect.
Conclusion
This paper has presented an analysis of corporate leniency application in the context of a dynamically evolving environment. We have shown how firms' symmetric uncertainty about the environment's future evolution can trigger strategic incentives for preemption. At the extreme, these incentives can unravel to the point where firms report long before the state of the environment itself gives them any real reason to do so. We feel that this aspect captures an important aspect of the strategic worry which leniency programs are thought to create. As such, it also leads to clear advice regarding policy and optimal design of leniency programs, by suggesting that a strong discrimination between first-and latecomers may be more crucial than offering high fine reductions in absolute terms, and by suggesting that authorities might be better off spreading information on its investigation efforts in small bits rather than in lumps.
As regards directions for further research, a key insight of our analysis is that, in an evolving world, discontinuities in time and state are essentially the only obstacle to a maximally effective leniency policy which elicits immediate self reporting at arbitrarily low cost. We have loosely discussed some examples of factors which might affect the magnitude of discontinuities, such as how authorities differentiate applications that are made at different but very close points in time. But given their very crucial role, and given that the two key dimensions 'time' (i.e., that firms can always reconsider) and 'state' (i.e., that the environment changes) represent a natural inherent aspect of the whistleblowing problem rather than a contrived extension, it should be worth further and more rigorously investigating candidate reasons for discontinuities and how policy might address them.
Concerning discontinuities in the state (or, more precisely, firms' assessment thereof), it should further be interesting to explicitly endogenize authorities' information policy. Our preliminary insights suggest that a rather 'talkative' policy might be better in terms of eliminating discontinuities, but how this peters out in a full-fledged model remains to be seen-specifically if we explicitly allow for private information not only on authorities' behalf, but if we also allow authorities to spread asymmetric, and possibly even misleading, information among firms. Eventually, such an approach should be able to refine our somewhat crude preliminary insights on how antitrust authorities might optimally disseminate their information among potential colluders so as to create a maximal degree of distrust, and thereby preemptive leniency application. Lemma A.2. In the game Γ • , if it is strictly optimal for player i to report in state ρ k−1 given that the other player plays σ j =σ k , then this is also strictly optimal given any other strategy σ j ∈ Σ k for j.
To see this, observe first that for any state ρ k ′ ∈ P,we have
i.e. given that the other player j reports at ρ k , assuming that he doesn't report in any other states can only increase i's payoff. This follows simply because player j reporting in any period unanimously lowers i's payoff from −αF to −αF if i reports as well, and from 0 to −F if i doesn't. Now player i's benefit from reporting vs. not reporting in ρ k−1 given σ j =σ k (and any continuation strategy σ i for player i) is
In contrast, i's benefit from reporting vs. not reporting given any other strategy σ j is
where the inequality uses the fact that the first term in the left-hand side is positive (recallα < 1), and bounds the second term from below using (A.2). Hence, if (A.3) is positive, then so is the left-hand side of (A.4), which establishes Lemma A. To see this, notice first that the former strategy yields −αF, so that it can only be improved upon by a strategy σ i for which
Notice next that in the subgame beginning at ρ k , j reporting for sure in this state implies that i's optimal strategy will be to do the same, so σ i (ρ k ) = R, which implies v • i (ρ k |σ i ,σ k ) = −αF. Since α <α, we thus have v • i (ρ k−1 |σ i ,σ k ) > v • i (ρ k |σ i ,σ k ) for any strategy which beats reporting in ρ k−1 .
Next, we use the following iterative argument: Fix any strategies σ i and σ j ∈ Σ k , and suppress them to ease notation. Then, if σ i maximizes player i's payoff in Γ, then for any state k ′ such that σ i (ρ k ′ ) = R and v
and σ i (ρ k ′ −1 ) = R. To see this, notice that σ i (ρ k ′ ) = R implies that the payoff in state ρ k is given by
which, since δ < 1, can be rearranged to give
. But σ i (ρ k ′ ) = R being optimal for i implies v • i (ρ k ′ ) −αF, and hence v • i (ρ k ′ −1 ) > −αF, so that it must be optimal for i not to report also in state k ′ − 1 (i.e., σ i (ρ k ′ −1 ) = R). Taken together, we thus have: For any optimal strategy with σ i (ρ k ′ ) = R and v
This argument can now be iterated downward starting at k ′ = k − 1: There, we already know that if the strategy is optimal and has σ i (ρ k−1 ) = R, then v
, which implies by the above result that the strategy must have σ i (ρ k−2 ) = R and
, so that the same argument can be made at k ′ = k − 2, and so forth. We thus find that the only strategy which can yield player i a higher payoff than reporting straightaway in ρ k−1 is σ k , which establishes Lemma A.3.
Taken together, Lemma A.1 through Lemma A.3 imply that in state ρ k−1 of the original game, given that player j reports at ρ k , it can only be optimal for i not to report if v • i (ρ k−1 |σ k ,σ k ) −αF. Using v • i (ρ k−1 |σ k ,σ k ) = − ∑ ∞ τ=1 δ τ γ(τ)αF = −Γ(δ )αF, this is equivalent to the condition stated in the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 5.1. It is useful to introduce the following notation: For any path ρ t with starting point ρ 0 = ρ and anyρ, let τ ρ t (ρ |ρ) ≡ inf t>0 {ρ t ρ} denote the instant t where the path first passesρ. Letv(ρ t |ρ) denote each firm's continuation payoff given that the current state is ρ t , and given that firms each report at any t if and only if ρ t ρ. Now, as in the discrete case, we obtain an upper bound on v(ρ t |ρ) by ignoring the risk of independent detection, as this only leads to earlier fine payments (of at least the same magnitude). Thus, v(ρ |ρ) −αF where d Pr(τ ρ t (ρ |ρ) t) is simply the instantaneous probability that ρ t crossesρ at any instant t, in which case a fine of −αF results. Now at any ρ <ρ, instead of adhering to the prescribed action of not reporting, a firm can instead report, which yields an instantaneous payoff of −αF and ends the game, instead of receiving the continuation payoffv(ρ |ρ). Combined with (A.5), a necessary condition for equilibrium is therefore that Notice that the right-hand side approaches α/α < 1 fort → 0. Thus, for any ε > 0, we can find at such that the right-hand side of (A.7) falls strictly short of 1 − ε.
For any ε > 0, there must therefore exist at such that Pr(τ ρ t (ρ |ρ) t ) 1 − ε, for all ρ <ρ. (A.8)
But this contradicts basic properties of Brownian motion, as described by the following auxiliary result:
Lemma A.4. For anyt > 0 and ε > 0, there exists ρ <ρ such that Pr(τ ρ t (ρ |ρ) t ) > 1 − ε.
To see this, recall that ρ t = f (X t ), where X t = W t + µt is Brownian motion with drift µ, and f (·) is a smooth and strictly increasing function. Thus, letting τ X t (a) ≡ inf t>0 {X t a} denote the time at which the process X t (starting at 0) first crosses a > 0, we have Pr(τ ρ t (ρ |ρ) t ) = Pr(τ X t ( f −1 (ρ) − f −1 (ρ)) t ).
By standard properties of Brownian motion with drift, the probability of first passing any a > 0 byt > 0 is given by
where Φ(·) denotes the cdf of the standard normal distribution. For anyt > 0, this probability continuously approaches 1 as a ց 0. Thus, for anyt > 0, we can find an a > 0 such that Pr(τ X t (a) t ) > 1 − ε. But then choosing ρ such that f −1 (ρ) = f −1 (ρ) − a will satisfy both Pr(τ ρ t (ρ |ρ) t ) > 1 − ε and ρ <ρ, as required by Lemma A.4.
